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Copyright Policy and the Problem of Generalizing
Eva E. Subotnik*
INTRODUCTION
Today we have heard a variety of concerns expressed by professional authors,
artists and performers. But one of the toughest aspects of determining how to make
the copyright system work better is generalizing about what is and is not working.
In these brief remarks, I would like to identify three areas that demonstrate this
difficulty.
At the outset, a disclaimer: I took the animating theme of this Symposium to be
the improvement of the financial stake of individual authors in some kind of direct
way. This mode of analysis should be distinguished from other approaches,
equally valid, that would seek out ways of benefitting individual creators by
improving the financial position of Hollywood studios, record labels, publishers
and the like. With that assumption stated, here are the three contexts that reflect the
difficulty in generalizing: (1) the issue of identifying the kinds of creative activity
that should properly be the focus of the copyright system; (2) the issue of
evaluating copyright law’s application to the Internet, which is both a catalyst for
and detractor from profitable authorship; and (3) the issue of framing the costs of
enforcing copyright interests.
I. GENERALIZING ABOUT “AUTHORSHIP”
Situations arise from time to time that raise the question of who is an “author” to
begin with—a term that the Copyright Act does not define.1 There has been much
fanfare over whether monkeys can be authors.2 But leaving that issue aside, there
is arguably some inconsistency over who is an “author” and, by extension, who
should benefit financially from the copyright system. So, for example, one
appellate court refused to find authorship in a wildflower display created by an
artist, Chapman Kelley, in Chicago’s Grant Park.3 Acknowledging that Kelley had
selected his species of flowers for “aesthetic” reasons, that the defendant had
actually marketed the display as “living landscape art,” and that Kelley’s garden
could be classified “as a work of postmodern conceptual art,”4 the court
nevertheless found the garden to be too much a product of natural forces—which
*
1.
2.
3.
4.

Assistant Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
See COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §§ 306, 313.2 (3d ed. 2014).
Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 293, 304.
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distinguished it, the court suggested, from a work like Jeff Koons’ Puppy.5
Now perhaps this one failed authorship bid need not trouble us; indeed, the
thrust of the case seemed to be about artistic control of the garden’s future rather
than securing financial rewards for the artist. Furthermore, it would be wrong to
infer a trend toward denying authorship claims. Another appellate court, for
example, recently found likely protectable authorship in a brief acting performance
by an aspiring actress, Cindy Lee Garcia.6 Her actor-ly rendering of four pages of
script was at least a minimal “creative contribution” to the underlying film.7
Accordingly, the Garcia decision might make those in favor of ensuring financial
rewards sanguine by signaling a broad opening for a new class of viable authorship
claims.
And yet, such an open-ended, capacious approach to authorship is not
necessarily a victory for the interests of professional authors. The Garcia case had
nothing to do with the enforcement of copyright as a legal tool to ensure a creative
livelihood. Furthermore, the Garcia court fell into the same formalistic approach
to assessing authorship as did the Kelley court—both avoiding the question of
whether these plaintiffs were creative professionals who were likely to have been
motivated by the copyright regime in undertaking their respective creative
activities. Moreover, the court in the Garcia case did not fully appreciate the
practical consequences of expanding authorship: that in the future, such expansion
may come at the particular expense of small-budget directors and producers—that
is, those who do typically rely on copyright—who must now be concerned about
preventing fractured copyright claims to their films.8
In short, when the questions of “Who is an author?” or “What is an act of
authorship?” become untethered from the overarching goals of copyright, it
becomes harder to shape law and policy toward assisting that subset of creators
who actually rely on copyright to make—or to supplement—a living.9
II. GENERALIZING ABOUT COPYRIGHT LAW’S APPLICATION TO
THE INTERNET
Congress established the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), in part, to
encourage the architecture that would permit the robust growth of online5. Id. at 305–06.
6. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit granted an en banc
rehearing on November 12, 2014. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 771 F.3d 647 (9th Cir. 2014). The oral
argument took place on December 15, 2014, and the decision was pending at the time this Article went
to print. See Status of En Banc Cases, U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT (Mar. 27, 2015),
http://perma.cc/5J8R-LNB6.
7. See Garcia, 766 F.3d at 933–34.
8. See, e.g., Brief for Professors of Intellectual Property Law as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 9–10, Garcia, 766 F.3d 929 (No. 12-57302).
9. Analogous concerns about protecting the relevant class of creators have led to the
development of heightened judicial scrutiny—above what the statute itself requires—of those claiming
co-author status. See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000); Thomson v.
Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1998).
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distributed content.10 And, in point of fact, many creators today clearly benefit a
great deal from the visibility and word-of-mouth publicity they can achieve that
would not have been possible in an earlier day. In particular, it means that
individual authors can market themselves without the help of a gatekeeping
distributor who would otherwise be exerting creative control as well as taking a
portion of the profits.11
And yet, it is clear that the role of the Internet as a business platform for
individual authors is a mixed blessing—a lesson that is frequently lost amidst the
prominent cases that have litigated the DMCA’s provisions. Many of those cases
involve corporate copyright owners suing Internet service providers (ISPs) of
various sizes.12 Thus, the kinds of assumptions that emerge—such as the
expectation that copyright owners can readily file thousands upon thousands of
takedown notices with ISPs—may reflect the most efficient arrangement in view of
the resources that larger copyright owners have to monitor their works. Likewise,
judicial interpretations that have gained traction, such as the requirement that ISPs
know or be aware of “specific instances of infringement” before they become
disqualified from safe harbor protection,13 are understandable where the aggrieved
party has the resources to regularly notify the ISP of specific infringement.
But the burden allocation among authors, ISPs and users starts to look a little
different when the relevant copyright owner is an individual author. For smalleroperation creators, the ability to spend hours per day submitting takedown notices
is simply not feasible.14 Moreover, there is a tipping point: such a use of time
becomes counter-productive with respect to copyright policy when it deprives the
author of resources he would otherwise be using to create new works, which is of
course the point of the copyright system in the first place.15
Furthermore, it is tempting—but often imprecise—to generalize about the main
types of uses that copyright owners are unhappy about:
either direct
commercialization by the service provider itself (driving ad revenues from which it
benefits, for example), or non-commercial uses by those who merely want to
consume media on a personal level or express their tastes and creative remixes with
members of the community.
10. See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49–50 (1998).
11. See, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 152 (2008) (“Any studio,
label, publisher, or, most important, individual author can make a work available to a global audience
simply by posting it on a Web site or releasing it onto a peer-to-peer network. . . . The economics of
digital distribution, in short, would seem to dictate a highly competitive, decentralized sector for
producing and disseminating creative works.”).
12. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013);
Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
13. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 30–31; see also UMG Recordings, 718 F.3d at 1021.
14. See, e.g., DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY,
CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 56 (2013) [hereinafter INTERNET POLICY
TASK FORCE GREEN PAPER].
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
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This is because authors have found that uses of their works fall into yet a third
category: commercial uses by corporate entities that discover the authors’ works
on the Internet and proceed to exploit them out in the brick-and-mortar world. As
one photographer, who specializes in high-quality photographs of insects, recently
put it:
[L]et me indulge in a list of recent venues where commercial interests have used my
work without permission, payment, or even a simple credit: Billboards, YouTube
commercials, pesticide spray labels, website banners, exterminator trucks, t-shirts,
iPhone cases, stickers, company logos, eBook covers, trading cards, board games,
video game graphics, children’s books, novel covers, app graphics, alt[ernative]med[icine] dietary supplement labels, press releases, pest control advertisements,
crowdfunding promo videos, coupons, fliers, newspaper articles, postage stamps,
advertisements for pet ants (yes, that’s a thing), canned food packaging, ant bait
product labels, stock photography libraries, and greeting cards.16

At a deeper level, attempts to generalize about the role of the Internet in
supporting, and hampering, creative livelihoods touch on larger problems of
generalizing about the nature of infringement today. In a number of instances,
high-profile lawsuits by individual creators have been directed at uses of their
works by other individual creators—cases such as Cariou v. Prince17 or Salinger v.
Colting.18 These cases get much press, in part, because the facts are easy to
describe and the cases raise colorful and important questions about how the
copyright system should apply when the issue is the creative needs of author v.
author. But those high-profile contests can mask the fact that much litigation by
individual authors is, in fact, directed squarely at straightforward commercial use—
often bread and butter stuff, such as use beyond the terms of a license.19
III. GENERALIZING ABOUT THE COSTS OF ENFORCEMENT
There is a real imbalance in perceptions about the costs of enforcing copyrights.
Those genuinely and rightly concerned about the expansion of copyright point out
how unpredictable it can be to gauge the sorts of uses that will elicit a cease-anddesist letter from an aggrieved copyright owner.20 From another perspective, most
individual authors cannot credibly threaten a lawsuit: indeed, the Copyright Office
has recently cited statistics estimating that “the median cost for a party to litigate a
copyright infringement lawsuit with less than $1 million at stake through appeal is
$350,000.”21 So, in a sense we find ourselves at a standstill in which it is once
16. Alex Wild, Bugging Out: How Rampant Online Piracy Squashed One Insect Photographer,
ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 24, 2014), http://perma.cc/D974-LBZ2.
17. 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
18. 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
19. See, e.g., Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2014); Beasley v. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 12 C 8715, 2014 WL 3600519 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2014).
20. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID
ECONOMY 108 (2008).
21. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT SMALL CLAIMS 25 (2013), available at
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again difficult to generalize—copyright litigation is, on the one hand, ready to leap
out and crush expressive reuse at any moment and, on the other hand, totally out of
reach for the ordinary author.
From either perspective, current enforcement mechanisms are hardly acting as
an optimal tool for ensuring reasonable compensation for authors. Furthermore, the
notion that one can parlay litigation, at the very least, into profitable name
recognition within the wider artistic community (as Patrick Cariou likely did by the
end22), is for most authors wishful thinking.
IV. WHAT LESSONS CAN WE DRAW?
Unfortunately, I am afraid that I have primarily succeeded in raising questions
about, rather than law-driven solutions to, how to help professional authors
monetize their creative works. But the main thing I have tried to underscore is that
a one-size-fits-all approach to copyright does not seem to serve the cause of
individual professional authors. In that regard, legal initiatives that assist in
differentiating among categories of authors and owners may be useful.
One example of this is the possibility of a small claims tribunal, as the
Copyright Office has recently proposed.23 Additional examples are the tailoring of
burden allocations under the DMCA,24 or the elimination of the requirement of
timely registration for eligibility for statutory damages,25 with respect to certain
kinds of authors or owners. It is to these sorts of initiatives that we should turn our
attention if we want to help professional authors going forward.

http://perma.cc/M8CZ-RGAL [hereinafter COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT].
22. See generally Cariou, 714 F.3d 694.
23. See generally COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 21.
24. See, e.g., INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE GREEN PAPER, supra note 14, at 58.
25. See, e.g., COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 21, at 112; see also id. at 22; Pamela
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 454 (2009) (“Because individual authors and small firms do not typically
register their copyrights within three months of publication, they rarely qualify for statutory damages or
attorney’s fee awards.”).

